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Corporate governance communication has steadily become more important as 
markets  have  globalised.  On  open  markets,  the  specific  report  on  economic-
financial disclosures supplements the communication system of companies, whose 
policies  are  founded  strongly  on  integration,  in  order  to  tackle  an  economic 
context  that  is  characterised  by  strong  competitive  dynamics  and  growing 
managerial complexity. 
Globalisation  tends  to  underline  the  importance  of  corporate  governance 
communication designed to assert a corporate culture of competitive confrontation, 
therefore  emphasising  communication  and  information  flows,  decision-making 
autonomy and operating accountability. 
 
Keywords:  Corporate  Governance  Communication;  Corporate  Governance 
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1.  Corporate  Governance  and  Managerial  Corporate  Governance 
Communication 
 
In a dynamic, constantly changing scenario – which has expanded the corporate 
boundaries  of  research,  finance,  manufacturing  and  marketing  –  corporate 
governance  communication  takes  on  new  market-oriented  characteristics
1,  in  a 
market-driven  approach
2,  which  emphasises  its  more  specifically  professional 
dimensions, and outlines a ‘managerial corporate governance communication’ that 
can put companies in a position to tackle the challenges of the global market
3. 
 
□  ‘Corporate  governance  is  concerned  with  the  nature  of  the 
interactions  and  relationships  between  the  firm  and  its  various 
stakeholders  in  the  process  of  decision-making  and  in  the  term  of 
control over firm resources. Corporate governance is to be understood 
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here, in general, as the interactions between internal actors, external 
actors  and  the  board  members  in  directing  a  corporation  for  value 
creation. For understanding corporate governance in a specific firm it 
is  necessary  to  identify  and  understand  the  behaviour  of  the  main 
actors,  including  the  board  members,  external  actors  and  internal 
actors, and the context in which governance takes place’
4. 
 
□ ‘Multinational corporations are at the forefront of the drive toward 
globalisation…The  centrality  of  corporations’  globalisation  strategies 
becomes increasingly apparent…The importance of how corporations are 
governed – their ownership and control, the objectives they pursue, the 
rights  they  respect,  the  responsibilities  they  recognize,  and  how  they 
distribute the value they create – has become a matter of the greatest 
significance, not simply for their directors and shareholders, but for the 
wider communities they serve’
5.  
 
In a modern managerial approach, corporate governance communication takes the 
shape of a specific relationship – based on continuity and responsibility – with the 
publics (internal, external and co-makers) to which the company must address its 
attention to develop a positive governance policy
6. 
 
□ ‘Globalisation affects the corporate governance in two ways. First, 
as  trade  barriers  erode,  the  locally  protected  product  marketplace 
disappears. A country’s firms’ performance is more easily measured 
against  global  standards.  Poor  performance  shows  up  more  quickly 
when  a  competitor  takes  away  market  share,  or  innovate 
quickly…Globalisation’s  second  effect  comes  from  capital  markets’ 
pressure  on  corporate  governance…Firms  expanding  into  global 
markets  often  prefer  to  use  stock,  rather  than  cash,  as  acquisition 
currency. If they want American investors to buy and hold that stock, 
they are pressed to adopt corporate governance measures that those 
investors feel comfortable with’
7. 
 
A  ‘managerial  corporate  governance  communication’  approach  must  first  and 
foremost  consider  the  behaviour  necessary  to  meet  the  demand  for  corporate 
information and communication, and must therefore correlate with the guidelines 
of  corporate  governance  actually  adopted  by  the  company.  In  particular,  the 
corporate  governance  model,  regulated  by  positive  law,  reflects  the  contrast 
between the so-called ‘Two-Tier System’ and the ‘One-Tier System’ (Figure 1)
8. 
The ‘Two-Tier System’ presupposes the separation of the managerial and control 
functions, producing two distinct organs: the Management Board, with governance 
functions, and the Supervisory Board, with control functions
9. 
The ‘Two-Tier System’ has recently been the subject of fierce debate, favoured 
by growing recourse to extraordinary financial operations related to mergers and 
acquisitions which, especially when they involve corporations of a significant size, 
make it necessary to reconcile the needs of the shareholders and management of the 
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Figure 1: Corporate Governance Models 
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Single Governance Organ 
 
 
Board of Directors 
 
Source:  Silvio  M.  Brondoni,  F.  Gnecchi,  ‘Corporate  Governance  Communication’  Seminar, 
University of Milan-Bicocca, 2006 
 
The  ‘One-Tier  System’,  on  the  other  hand,  presupposes  that  the  corporate 
functions of management and control are exercised by a single organ, the Board of 
Directors. This organ therefore has all the powers necessary both to manage the 
company, and to control the activities undertaken
10. In Italy, in particular, the small 
average size of companies seems to be the main reason for the prevalence of the 
‘One-Tier System’. 
In order to meet the need for information and communication about corporate 
behaviour, and to correlate with the guidelines of corporate governance actually 
adopted by the company (i.e. the alternative ‘One-Tier’ or ‘Two-Tier’ models) a 
‘managerial corporate governance communication’ approach, must come to terms 
with the chosen corporate model. Even in this case, we can identify two alternative 
guideline models, which do not in fact derive from precise legislation, but from the 
relevant specific national culture of the individual companies. In this context, we 
can identify the following models of corporate structure and prevailing orientation 
of communication and information flows: 
-  the  Anglo-American  model,  which  is  characterised  by  highly  fragmented 
ownership, i.e. a broad shareholder base, and a corporate culture that tends to 
be Market Oriented, which presupposes a particular and continuous focus on 
the outside world, for the very purpose of generating interest and consensus 
around the performance of the corporation and of attracting potential new 
parties willing to share the corporate risk; 
-  the  European  model,  characterised  by  the  predominant  presence  of 
companies with highly concentrated ownership, i.e. a small shareholder base; 
unlike the previous model, the European model is Insider Oriented, which 
entails a particular focus on the interests of those who already have a part of 
the capital stock. 
 
The public company model needs to adopt clear, consistent criteria to regulate 
relations with management and the ownership, which may be fragmented among 
several  providers  of  risk  capital,  configuring  the  so-called  ‘diffuse  ownership’. 
What  is  more,  in  global  companies,  management  also  contributes  to  the 
competitive corporate vitality according to a ‘diffuse’ logic, with the result that the 
separation between ownership and management generates interpretative viewpoints 
(of analysis and evaluation) of the members of one group or the other that can 
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simplify the complex reality of global corporations, enjoying rapid success; their 
information/communication  flows  are  often  ‘critically  dialectic’  with  the 
company’s corporate governance communication. 
 
□ ‘It is often argued that the majority of shareholders cannot be expected 
to discharge the traditional duties of stewardship that stem from ownership 
because they lack the necessary financial incentives. This argument against 
investor activism arises where there is a liquid market like in Britain and 
the United States so that typically ownership stakes are small in percentage 
terms…Shareholders  activism  or  engagement  derives  from  investors 
developing  long-term  face-to-face  relationships  with  the  companies  in 
which they invest. Rather than their involvement being little more than that 
of anonymous speculators, they became the owners with an interest in the 
company progress…The need for this changer relationship has come out in 
recent years because of the increased dominance of financial institutions as 
shareholders...  The  growth  in  the  size  of  pension  funds  and  insurance 
companies means that increasingly, in many cases, institutional portfolios 
contain shares in a very large number of companies, if not every one listed 
on the market. At the same time relatively fewer shares are now held by 
individuals than in the past’ 
11. 
 
On the other hand, the European model, which favours an Insider Orientation, 
seems  to  limit  corporate  governance  communication  to  the  protection  of  the 
interests  of  risk  capital  providers,  in  other  words,  to  favour  the  so-called 
shareholder view. In fact, global markets also force the so-called European model 
to adopt an ‘open’ form of management of R&D, operations, finance, marketing 
and sales, with the result that the Shareholder View evolves into a more complex, 
ramified  network  approach.  Where  corporate  governance  communication  is 
concerned,  the  European  model thus tends to converge on the Anglo-American 
model and consequently the traditional dichotomy between the prevalence of the 
direction of inside/outside information flows tends to be surpassed by a new and 
more  up-to-date  dichotomy  based  on  the  competitive  nature  of  the  information 
flows, that reflects the Stakeholder View/Corporate View contradiction. 
 
 
2. Corporate Governance. Communication and Information Tools 
 
In the face of different corporate obligations and needs, corporate governance 
communication may be activated systematically, or occasionally. What is more, 
depending on the contents to be disseminated, it may regard compulsory documents 
(whose communication is imposed and regulated by laws and codes of practice), or 
discretional  documents  (made  public  by  the  company’s  choice,  due  to  the 
importance of the subject). And finally, corporate governance communication may 
be  disseminated  using  specific  communication  tools  (as  in  the  case  of  the 
publication  of  financial  statement  data  and  results),  or  suitable  channels  of 
information  (for  example,  channelling  corporate  news  and  management  data 
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company activates specific forms of communication – addressing specific audience 
brackets  –  which  allow  it  to  exert  complete  control  over  the  contents  of  the 
communication,  and  over  the  times  and  means  of  disseminating  the  message 
(which is obviously ‘signed’ by the company). However, the use of information 
channels also envisages the ‘active’ participation of the media, which ‘sign’ (and 
are  therefore  responsible)  for  the  information  contained  in  the  corporate 
governance communication of a particular company
12. 
For  example,  where  compulsory  documents  are  concerned,  legislation  often 
specifies them in detail, even defining the minutest contents; one concrete example 
of this is the documents that accompany the annual summary of corporate results 
(statutory financial statements, board of auditors’ report, external auditors’ report, 
etc.). Other documents have recently been made necessary by specific legislation, 
for  example,  the  Ethics  Code  regarding  administrative  accountability
13.  The 
dissemination  of  discretional  documents  is  a  result  of  the  corporate  culture  of 
openness to the markets (although it can generally be noted that this decreases as 
the integration of networking made necessary by the global market increases) and it 
is  linked  in  particular  to  the  specific  sensitivity  that  each  company  reveals  to 
corporate  communication
14.  For  example,  with  an  ‘environmental  report’  or  a 
‘social report’, but also an ‘intangibles report’ or ‘gender budgeting’. 
Figure 2 below indicates the main tools of communication and information that 
are a part of managerial corporate governance. 
 
Figure 2: Corporate Governance – Communication and Information Tools 
 
Corporate Governance 
Primary Communication/Information Tools 
 
-  Corporate Governance Report 
-  Statutory Financial Statements (yearly, interim, consolidated) 
-  Board of Auditors’ Report 
-  External Auditors’ Report 
-  Ethics Code 
-  Intangibles Report 
-  Environmental Report 
-  Social Report 
-  Gender Budget  
-  Information  about  relations  between  parent  company  and  subsidiary  companies  (e.g.  joint 
ventures, acquisitions and disposals of company branches and significant equity investments, 
etc.) 
-  Information about meetings with market operators 
-  Interviews and declarations to mass media 
-  Information about Corporate Responsibility 
-  Information about Corporate Social Responsibility 
-  Information about Social / Educational / Research Partnerships 
 
Source:  Silvio  M.  Brondoni,  F.  Gnecchi,  ‘Corporate  Governance  Communication’  Seminar, 
University of Milan-Bicocca, 2006 
 
The ‘Corporate Governance Report’ is therefore a brief document that presents 
the  structures  and  procedures  of  corporate  governance,  whose  preparation  and 
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Figure 3: Key Issues in the ‘Corporate Governance Report’ 
 
-  Board Structure& Director Qualifications 
  (Composition of the Board; Selection of Board Members; Directors Qualification Standards; 
Board Leadership; Committees of the Board; Term, Retirement, Resignation) 
-  Board Responsibilities, Compensation, Orientation & Continuing Education 
  (Approval of Major Strategies and Financial Objectives; Executive & Director Compensation; 
Board Interaction with Outside Constituencies; Director Orientation & Continuing Education; 
Conflict of Interest) 
-  Board Operations: Access to Management & Advisors 
  (Director Interaction with Management; Access to Independent Advisors) 
 
Source:  Silvio  M.  Brondoni,  F.  Gnecchi,  ‘Corporate  Governance  Communication’  Seminar, 
University of Milan-Bicocca, 2006 
 
 
3.  Corporate  Governance:  Information  and  Communication  in  the 
Stakeholders View and the Corporate View 
 
The  economic  wellbeing  of  the  last  thirty  years,  the  improved  literacy  and  the 
spread of digital information and communications technologies have helped to make 
consumers, suppliers and investors more expert and careful in their purchasing and 
investment behaviour
16. Once easily manipulated, consumers, suppliers and investors 
evolve  in  markets  where  relations  between  supply  and  demand  (final  and 
intermediate) are based on networking relations, competition is very strong and is 
developed on open markets, and finally a wide range of sources of information is 
available and accessible at ever-lower costs, modifying the very nature of relations 
between the global enterprise and its internal and external interfaces. 
 
□  ‘The  recent  scandals  in  corporations  have  made  many 
commentators  reflect  and  react  for  creating  sustainable  value  for 
shareowners,  customers,  employees  and  communities…A  governance 
revolution seems to be taking place, and while many official reforms 
have already been passed following Enron’s meltdown, board are going 
even  further,  instituting  sweeping  changes  in  their  composition, 
structure, and practices on a scale not seen since skyrocketing executive 
pay gave birth to the modern governance movement in the 1980s’ 
17. 
 
Global managerial economics thus increasingly reveal the contrasting vision that is 
inherent in the so-called corporate view (i.e. the corporate and unitary perspective of the 
corporation), distinguishing it from the stakeholder view (i.e. the multiform and very 
differentiated  perspective  expressed  by  the  various  stakeholders)  where  corporate 
governance communication is concerned (Figure 2). In this context, for example, the 
increase in consumers’ critical capability in open markets contributes directly to the 
improvement of the market on the final demand side (which translates into greater 
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transparency  and  accountability  on  the  part  of  supply  and  the  different  levels  of 
intermediate demand (retailers, wholesalers, purchasing groups, communities, etc.). In 
fact, taken as a whole, a lack of choice, access to information, pressure on prices, 
striving for product safety, and disloyalty in commercial transactions modify relations 
between consumers, trade and industry, to the benefit of a new sense of responsibility 
on  the  part  of  businesses.  Similarly,  in  the  context  of  relations  between  a  certain 
business,  the  media  and  the  public,  global  markets  tend  to  develop  new  forms  of 
consumer consciousness which generates pressure groups that force growing attention 
on the limitations of natural resources, the uncontrollable growth of waste and the social 
costs of the various types of consumption. These choices can modify the determinants 
of  consumption  of  specific  goods  (for  example  furs  of  protected  species,  beauty 
products whose experimentation exploits vivisection, etc.), proposing the recognition of 
the social costs of use of the environment. 
 
Figure 4: Stakeholder View and Corporate View 
 
Stakeholder View vs. Corporate View 
Equity / Asymmetrical information 
Correctness / Specificity 
Comprehensiveness / Partiality 
Timeliness / ‘Timing News’ Control 
Transparency / Opacity 
 
Source:  Silvio  M.  Brondoni,  F.  Gnecchi,  ‘Corporate  Governance  Communication’  Seminar, 
University of Milan-Bicocca, 2006 
 
More  generally,  as  Figure  4  shows,  in  the  economics  of  global  corporations’ 
market  relations,  the  perspective  of  the  stakeholders’  ‘public’  interests  tends  to 
instil value in a corporate governance communication policy based on standards of 
equity  in  information,  i.e.  information  disclosed  symmetrically  to  the  various 
internal, co-maker and external interlocutors
18. On the other hand, the corporate 
perspective tends to reward a managerial function that presupposes asymmetrical 
information flows, which envisage that the openness of the corporate system is 
graduated to the different publics present on the various markets. This openness is 
connected directly to the interest shown by individual groups of interlocutors. 
What is more, the stakeholder view presupposes ‘correct’ corporate governance 
communications (i.e. designed to present a given corporate event with an uncritical 
sentiment, without ‘forcing’ its interpretation in line with precise, and often not 
immediately  comprehensible,  corporate  interests)  and  ‘comprehensive’  (i.e. 
interpreting company events examined from various viewpoints, in order to prevent 
possible speculation and controversy). On the other hand, the corporate view tends 
to  disclose  ‘specific’  information  (with  an  ‘interpretation’  designed  to  pursue 
definite and contingent corporate interests and disseminated by the most suitable 
channels) and ‘partial (with a deliberately limited ‘view’ of facts and events, to 
emphasise the positive aspects for the organisation). 
 
□ ‘Industry and a competitive environment are among the factors that, 
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Governance  systems  may  vary  significantly  between  knowledge-
intensive firms and capital-intensive firms. Some of these differences 
may  also  relate  to  variations  in  property  rights…  In  stakeholder-
sensitive industries there may be particular emphasis on transparency 
and accountability. Boards in such industries will, more than boards in 
other  industries,  be  related  to  various  stakeholder  concerns  such  as 
corporate social responsibility. This is the case, for example, in highly 
polluting industries, the energy sector the health care sector, etc’ 
19. 
 
And  finally,  the  stakeholder  view  presupposes  corporate  governance 
communications that are ‘timely’ and ‘transparent’ (characteristics with an obvious 
significance, which do not require specific explanation, referred directly to basic 
sentiments, which are elementary and easily shared)
20. Therefore, from a corporate 
viewpoint, corporate governance communication often tends to be distinguished by 
‘Timing News Control’ (i.e. disclosure of information to the various publics and 
stakeholders that is partial, strongly controlled in its contents, timing and method of 
dissemination) and ‘information opacity’ (i.e. a generalised tendency to ‘remain 





4. Corporate Governance, Communication and Global Corporations 
 
At the end of the Nineties and the early years of the new Millennium, there was a 
rapid acceleration in the globalisation of the world economy
22. 
Competition has become global and for numerous sectors the target market is no 
longer a State or a continent, but vast groupings of industrialised countries. This 
phenomenon, which is particularly evident in Europe because of the size of domestic 
markets,  has  made  traditional  multinational  organisations  (multidomestic 
corporations)  obsolete,  and  they  have  been  replaced  by  forms  of  transnational 
organisation  (network  organisation),  which  are  able  to  face  up  to  the  economic 
interdependence  of the target markets (global markets). Domestic markets are no 
longer separate spaces but must be managed as vast aggregates of target markets, 
because what takes place in one market influences all the others
23. 
Corporate  governance  communication  has  steadily  become  more  important  as 
markets have globalised. On open markets, the specific report on economic-financial 
disclosures supplements the communication system of companies, whose policies are 
founded  strongly  on  integration
24,  in  order  to  tackle  an  economic  context  that  is 
characterised by strong competitive dynamics and growing managerial complexity. 
In global markets, corporate governance communication interfaces on one side 
with the new role of the Nation-State
25, and on the other with the structure of the 
‘network organisation’ of the global corporation. 
 
□ ‘In the contemporary story of transnationalisation of antitrust… the 
path  currently  threaded  privileges  the  development  of  normative 
institutions or rules of the game –common beliefs and cultural values- 
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It appears to favour mechanisms of self-regulation, socialization and 
self-responsabilisation  over  logics  of  coercion  and  external 
constraints… The concept of hegemony appears more directly useful 
and  applicable  in  this  context.  The  ways  in  which  the  games  of 
negotiation and collective decision-making will combine and interact 




First  of  all,  where  the  role  of  the  State  is  concerned,  the  globalisation  of  the 
economy reveals new problems to manage specific national forces and resources. As 
open markets take hold, national governments tend to lose some of their prerogatives, 
to the extent that their transnational authority weakens
27. A market economy demands 
a  strong  State  that  sets  and  enforces  the  rules  of  the  competitive  game,  but 
globalisation also undermines the role of national governments. As a result, global 
capitalism favours the development of powerful supranational institutions (like the 
European Commission on the issue of the protection of privacy, the Directorate for 
competition,  the  O.E.C.D.  on  the  issue  of  corruption,  the  World  Bank,  the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation), which, also drawing on 
the  knowledge  network  structures,  can  issue  consistent  directives  that  orient  the 
decisional sphere of national governments, particularly with regard to environmental, 
food and healthcare problems
28. 
 
□ ‘Today there is no lack of data informing the general economic 
debate…However, the reports and releases coming from central bank 
have a special status… The knowledge production of central banks is 
considered  particularly  apt,  relevant  and  consequential.  Central 
bankers constitute a global knowledge community… This autonomous 




In  addition  to  the  new  role  of  the  Nation-States,  in  global  markets  corporate 
governance communication must also come to terms with the new problems of the 
development of supranational demand segments, or groups of investors, customers and 
suppliers present in each country with similar behaviour or similar expectations
30. 
Globalisation therefore does not simplify corporate governance by homogenising 
(or standardising) the managerial conduits of corporations in the various countries, 
but highlights the fact that in each country there are groups of stakeholders with the 
same needs, that can therefore be approached with the same corporate policies (i.e. 
with identical brands, common funding plans, etc.)
31. 
The  new  context  of  global  competition  has  drastically  modified  the  role  of 
strategic  alliances,  imposing  a  collaborative  network  logic  between  groups  of 
companies with similar profiles and dimensions
32. In fact, the multinationals from 
developing  economies  are  structured  to  compete  at  a  global  level  (typically  in 
networks  and  constellations  of  companies),  while  the  larger  multinationals  of 
industrialised  economies  promote  numerous  forms  of  competitive  cooperation, 
through  strategic  alliances  both  equity  and  non-equity.  ‘Strategic  competitive 
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adopted today by companies operating on global, over-supplied markets, where the 
company  performance  of  individual  units  (local)  and  overall  at  corporate  level 
(global),  imposes  a  new  and  fundamental  concept  of  corporate  accountability, 
which sees sustainable growth as a corporate development benchmark. 
The  globalisation  of  the  markets  determines  new  competition  paradigms: 
companies  must  be  able  to  compete  according  to  ‘market-space  competition’ 
logics, proposing competitive boundaries in which the definition of the rules that 
companies must conform to cannot be oriented by technical characteristics, even 
when these are important, such as the choice of the two-tier model instead of the 
one-tier  model.  In  fact,  on  open  markets,  competition  space  is  redefined  by 
‘market-space management’ logics and as a result it is difficult to define in sectors 
of activity, but can more appropriately be linked to systems of intangible resources 
that help to qualify companies’ competitive profiles
33. 
And  finally,  the  challenges  of  globalisation  determine  the  orientation  of  the 
company to the market focusing on the concept of customer value management, i.e. 
a continuative approach designed to offer goods/services with a higher value than 
those  of  the  competition  to  selected  aggregates  of  demand  (market-driven 
management). In fact, we tend to overcome the customer orientation which favours 
the expectations of the customer/consumer and shows itself to be inadequate on 
highly competitive markets, primarily developing the competitive dimension of the 
demand  vacuum.  A  competitive  approach  to  the  market  (market-driven 
management) is therefore designed to guarantee an efficient intersection between 
demand  (intermediate  and  final)  and  supply,  developing  products  (new  and 
improved, and in any case able to satisfy ‘demand bubbles’ better than competitors) 
and organising physical trade and communication flows (push/pull communication) 
between the company and its clientele. This approach presupposes a market-driven 
managerial  mind-set  which  requires:  a  corporate  structure  organised  by  market 
rather  than  by  product  or  plant;  a  corporate  culture  oriented  to  results  and 
motivated by variable demand and instability in the context of competition; the 
preparation  of  new  metrics  of  intangible  and  tangible  factors,  to  estimate  the 
corporate performance in external and changing contexts
34. 
Market-space competition conditions define sophisticated competition boundaries 
with a global matrix, in which space and time combine to form and dynamically 
modify  the  relevant  competitive  context,  thus  making  the  evaluation  of  any 
conditions of market predominance particularly difficult to assess using traditional 
and consolidated performance and position indices
35.  
In  the  last  two  decades,  the  globalisation  of  corporate  organisation,  and 
encroaching  over-supply,  has  induced  numerous  large  corporations  to  develop 
plans to extend their activities, according to a global corporate viewpoint, which 
tends  to  reorganise  distinctive  competitive  capabilities  in  search  of  vaster 
economies of scale, activating corporate aggregations that are difficult from a legal-
corporate  point  of  view,  but  above  all  in  terms  of  the  integration  of  different 
national corporate cultures. 
As  a  result,  globalisation  tends  to  underline  the  importance  of  corporate 
governance communication designed to assert a corporate culture of competitive 
confrontation,  therefore  emphasising  communication  and  information  flows, 
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The  transformation  from  a  local  company  (and  then  from  a  multidomestic 
company) to a global network organisation, i.e. a company with several competitive 
spaces,  questions  certain  consolidated  concepts  (including  the  disquisition  of  the 
‘one-tier’/’two-tier’  system)  because  space  becomes  the  critical  element,  which 
demands a commitment to ‘hold together’ management that is often ‘dispersed’ in 
60/80 countries and often also fragmented ownership. 
Corporate governance communication of global ‘network organisations’ therefore 
interfaces with employees, co-makers and partners – in a dimension of transparent 
integration – emphasising the ‘corporate ethics’ of the new values of citizenship of 
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1  ‘Globalisation  forces  us  to  instil  value  into  a  corporate  culture  that  strives  for  competitive 
confrontation  and  therefore  to  develop  communication  and  information  flows,  manufacturing 
decentralisation, decision-making autonomy and operating accountability …In conditions of market-
space  competition,  businesses  operate  with  ramified,  disseminated  and  strongly  interconnected 
structures. In these complex markets, internal relations between employees must develop in harmony 
with vaster systems of continuous connections maintained with co-makers and external interlocutors, 
and  therefore  the  organisational  culture  must  open  up  to  a  more  competitive  view of corporate 
culture.’ See Silvio M. Brondoni, Network e cultura della concorrenza, in Silvio M. Brondoni (ed.), 
Cultura di network performance e dinamiche competitive, Giappichelli, Turin, 2006, p. 4. 
2  Cf.  Jean-Jacques  Lambin,  Silvio  M.  Brondoni,  Ouverture  de  ‘Market-Driven  Management’, 
Symphonya. Emerging Issues in Management (www.unimib.it/symphonya), n. 1, 2000-2001.  
3 Cf. Silvio M. Brondoni, Comunicazione integrata d’impresa e ‘nuove sfide’ competitive, in R. 
Filippini, G. Pagliarani, G. Petroni (eds.), Progettare e gestire l’impresa innovativa. I nuovi percorsi 
per affrontare la complessità degli anni Novanta, Etaslibri, Milan, 1992.  
4 See John Child, Suzana B. Rodriguez, The International Crisis in Confidence in Corporations, 
Journal of Management and Governance, 2003, n. 7, p. 213. 
5 See Thomas Clark, Marie de la Rama, Corporate Governance and Globalisation, Sage, London, 
2006, p. 31. 
6 ‘The integrated approach to corporate communication – designed to conceive in a single vision 
the  various  initiatives  to  support  the  acquisition  of  the  necessary  intra-organisational  and 
intercompany consensus – not infrequently represents the assumption of managerial effectiveness 
conveniently  associated  to  processes  of  economic  governance.’  See  Daniela  M.  Salvioni, 
Comunicazione,  cultura  e  governo  economico  d’impresa,  in  Silvio  M.  Brondoni  (ed.),  La 
comunicazione d’impresa, Sinergie, May-December 1997, p. 69. 
7 See Jeffrey Neil Gordon, Mark J. Roe, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 42.  
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executive board. The supervisory board consist of non-executives, often representing shareholders 
and various other shareholder groups. The executive board has the day-to-day tasks delegated to it. 
The executive board consists of the TMT, and the CEO is usually the chairperson of the executive 
board. It is the supervisory board that is called the ‘board’. In the Scandinavian model there is one-
board system, but the board members are generally non-executives elected by the shareholders. It is 
compulsory to delegate the day-to-day running to a CEO, and is therefore a two-tier system. The 
CEO can be replaced by an executive board, but in practice this hardly ever happens’. See Ruth V. 
Aguilera, Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and 
Determinants, Academy of Management Review, n. 28, 2003, pp. 447-465, passim.  
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Management Review, n. 28, 2003, pp. 447-465, passim.  
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Competition, Monopoly and Corporate Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2003, pp. 206-207. 
12 Cf. Silvio M. Brondoni, Comunicazione, risorse invisibili e strategia competitiva d’impresa, 
Sinergie, n. 43-44, May-December 1997.  
13 Cf. Giovanni Fiori, Riccardo Tiscini, Francesca Di Donato, Corporate Governance, evoluzione 
normativa ed informazione esterna d’impresa, in Daniela M. Salvioni (ed.), Corporate Governance 
e sistemi di controllo della gestione aziendale, Franco Angeli, Milan, 2004. 
14 Cf. Flavio Gnecchi, Corporate Governance nell’impresa a rete, in Silvio M. Brondoni (ed.), 
Cultura di network performance e dinamiche competitive, Giappichelli Turin, 2006. 
15 Cf. Luisa Bosetti, La gestione del consenso e le relazioni di governo, in Daniela M. Salvioni 
(ed.), Corporate Governance, controllo di gestione e risorse immateriali, Franco Angeli, Milan, 
2004 
16 ‘…in the general company system, it is now possible to outline a specific communication sub-
system, designed to grasp existing opportunities and constraints… In other words, we have acquired 
understanding of the forms of communication implicit in the development of the general economic 
combination… In the same way, we have understood the increased potential to transmit explicit 
messages, i.e. structured specifically and transmitted to positively influence company dynamics.’ See 
Daniela M. Salvioni, Il bilancio d’esercizio nella comunicazione integrata d’impresa, Giappichelli, 
Turin 1992, pp. 26-27. 
17 See Business Week, 7 October 2002, p. 58.  
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to:  Silvio  M.  Brondoni,  La  comunicazione  integrata  d’impresa,  in  Gianpiero  Lugli  (ed.), 
Comunicazione e pubblicità. Analisi economica e dinamiche competitive, Egea, Milan, 1993. 
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intensive  firms  and  capital-intensive  firms.  In  stakeholders-sensitive  industries  there  may  be 
particular emphasis on transparency and accountability. Boards in such industries will, more than 
boards  in  other  industries,  be  related  to  various  stakeholders  concerns  such  as  corporate  social 
responsibility. This is the case, for example, in highly polluting industries, the energy sector, the 
health care sector, etc.’. See Morten Huse, D.O. Neubaum, Jonas Gabrielsson, Corporate innovation 
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